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PETITIONS
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Ed Williams. Ed.D. Chair
Concerned Citizens For Effective Government
Facebook.com/groups/ccegov
(678) 304-7736
email: truthcrushtheearth@gmail.com
Twitter.com truthcrushthee2
https://www.casemine.com/
https://law.justia.com/cases/
https://www.courtlistener.com/
1 Pom Eq Jur § 260
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
1. Eq, Jur § 483
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
2. High on Injunction §§ 1239, 1269, 1271
§ 1239
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
§ 1269 https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
§ 1271 https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
3. Injunctions § 1300
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
3. Munic Corp § 395
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
Municipal Code Dillon, 4th Edition
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
In Keen, this Court recognized the "prevailing
rule" that "any property-holder or municipal taxpayer" had the
right 2e3a not conferred by statute 2e3a to "enjoin municipal corporations
and their officers from transcending their lawful powers or violating their
legal duties in any mode which will injure the taxpayers[.]" See Keen, 101
Ga. at 592-593 (citation and punctuation omitted).
Keen reasoned that taxpayers of a municipality
were in a similar position to and had interests similar in nature to that of
private corporation stakeholders (creditors and stockholders) and, therefore,
should have the same ability (i.e., standing) as private corporation
stakeholders to "attend their own interests," those being to prevent
through litigation the illegal acts of municipal authorities, which would
otherwise cause loss and expense that taxpayers would ultimately bear. Id. at
593.
See Keen v. City of Waycross, 101 Ga. 588, 592-594 (3) (29 SE 42) (1897); see also Koger v. Hunter, 102 Ga. 76, 79-80 (29 SE 141) (1897) (trial court erred in denying taxpayers' petition to enjoin county commissioners from misappropriating county funds)
INJUNCTION AND EQUITY RELIEF O.C.G.A.
9-5-1 or O.C.G.A. 9-11-65
Sons of Confederate Veterans v. HENRY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Ga: Supreme Court 2022
This Court then routinely began applying Keen's rule to allow taxpayers to sue both cities and counties for alleged ultra vires actions, even without necessarily alleging an injury to the taxpayer, when it was clear that the ultra vires action would create an illegal debt, cause illegal expenses to be incurred, result in increased taxes, or misappropriate public funds. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lasseter, 114 Ga. 275, 281 (40 SE 287) (1901) ("Any taxpayers of the county had a right to apply to a court of equity to prevent the county commissioners from making contracts which they had no authority to make.");
Savage v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 671, 671-672 n.1 (251 SE2d 268) (1978) (concluding that the plaintiff, as a taxpayer of the City of Atlanta, had standing to seek injunction to prevent the City's commissioner of finance from paying out public funds under the authority of certain ordinances);
Clark v. Cline, 123 Ga. 856, 864 (51 SE 617) (1905) (taxpayers could sue to enjoin county from making illegal payments to city school system because taxpayer's contribution to public fund constituted a "pecuniary interest" that authorized him prevent "illegal diversion" of public funds); Fluker v. City of Union Point, 132 Ga. 568, 570 (64 SE 648) (1909) (noting well-established rule that "taxpayer may enjoin municipal corporations and their officers from making an unauthorized appropriation of the corporate funds or an illegal disposition of the corporate property"); Dancer v. Shingler, 147 Ga. 82, 84 (92 SE 935) (1917) (taxpayers can enjoin county board members from executing illegal contract that would expend money of taxpayers or incur indebtedness).
Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 272 (3) (b) (ii) (840 SE2d 423) (2020) (noting that, under Georgia law, the plaintiff's "status as a taxpayer generally affords him standing to seek to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of public funds" (emphasis added));
Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 43 (1) (70 SE2d 360) (1952) ("This court has many times held that citizens and taxpayers of both counties and municipalities have such interest as will authorize them to maintain actions to enjoin the unlawful disposition of public funds or property.").
Head, 215 Ga. at 265-266 (2) (taxpayers had standing to seek to enjoin State Revenue Commissioner from issuing liquor license to defendant);
See Keen v. City of Waycross, 101 Ga. 588, 592-594 (3) (29 SE 42) (1897); see also Koger v. Hunter, 102 Ga. 76, 79-80 (29 SE 141) (1897) (trial court erred in denying taxpayers' petition to enjoin county commissioners from misappropriating county funds).
Shadix et al. v. Carroll County et al. 239 Ga. App. 191 (1999);
Taxpayers had attacked statutes' constitutionality and sought injunctive relief without an individualized injury
Rich v. State of Ga., 227 SE 2d 761 - Ga: Supreme Court 1976
Henderson v. MARTA, 225 SE 2d 424 - Ga: Supreme Court 1976
Camp v. Marta, 189 SE 2d 56 - Ga: Supreme Court 1972
Salem v. Tattnall County, 302 SE 2d 99 - Ga: Supreme Court 1983
Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 821 SE 2d 575 - Ga: Court of Appeals 2018
Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 859 SE 2d 33 - Ga: Supreme Court 2021
SHERRER et al. v. HALE et al., 285 S.E.2d 714, 248 Ga. 793 (1982)
Dr. Sherrer also argues that because Mr. Hale has an
adequate remedy at law (money damages), injunctive (equitable) relief was not authorized. As
is often the case, in order to determine whether equitable relief is
authorized, we must first
ascertain what rights, if any, the plaintiff has which warrant protection.
Thus, we defer this question
until after consideration of the merits.
Dr. Sherrer argues
that the waiver provision is ineffective because the question of whether an
adequate remedy at law exists determines if the trial court has
equity jurisdiction and, under Code Ann. § 24-112, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the
trial court by agreement of the parties.
Although the
agreement of the parties is entitled to consideration, we agree that the parties cannot by waiver or consent
confer equity jurisdiction on a court where it is otherwise without
jurisdiction. E.g., Gray v. Gray, 229 Ga. 460, 461 (2) (192 SE2d
334) (1972); Sweatman v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 112 (97 SE2d 320)(1957); Code
Ann. § 24-112. We also agree
that equitable relief is improper if the complainant has a remedy at law which
is "adequate," i.e., "as *798 practical
and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the
remedy in equity." Middlebrooks v. Lonas, 246 Ga. 720, 721 (272
SE2d 687)(1980). See also Code Ann. § 37-120. However, in this case Mr. Hale is
without an adequate remedy at
law because he is currently being deprived of his investment and his elected
positions as director and secretary of a corporation in which he owns a
one-half interest. The
loss of these positions and their influence over the future direction of the
corporation in which he has an interest is not compensable in damages.
See Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204 (3) (116 SE 810) (1922).
EARLY v. EARLY, 252 S.E.2d 618, 243 Ga. 125 (1979)
"`Where equity acquires jurisdiction for any purpose it will retain jurisdiction to give full and complete relief, whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes relating to the subject matter.' Fuller v. Dillon, 220 Ga. 36(lf) (136 SE2d 733)(1964); Code Ann. § 37-105." Gorman v. Gorman, supra.
***LUTHER et al. v. LUTHER, 289 Ga. App. 428, 657 S.E.2d 574 (2008)
Equity jurisdiction is established and allowed for the
protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar circumstances, the
operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from
anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done.[2]
Thus, "[e]quity will grant relief only where there is no available adequate and complete remedy at law."[3] As otherwise stated, "[e]quitable relief is improper if the complainant has a remedy at law which is adequate, i.e., as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy inequity."[4]
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
finding that it had equity jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief.
"Where equity acquires jurisdiction
for any purpose it will retain jurisdiction to give full and complete relief,
whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes relating to the subject
matter."[24]
STOKES v. STOKES, 273 S.E.2d 169, 246 Ga. 765 (1980)
"such other and further relief as may
be equitable and just."
"such
other and further relief as the court deems meet and proper."
[This is just basically an open-ended statement indicating that the court has power to enterwhatever orders the court believes are necessary/appropriate under the circumstances. Usually this last sentence is a catch all phrase which asks the court for any additional relief or orders as they come up. It is boilerplate language that is in most complaints and summons. The phrase simply means the court is retaining jurisdiction and the ability to enter additionalorders should deem such are necessary and warranted.]
Regardless of the prayers of the
petition and answer as to "other and further relief," ... a "party may amend his
pleadings as a matter of course" (Code Ann. § 81A-115) to raise any claim,
not already adjudicated, as he or she has against the opposing party (Code Ann.
§ 81A-118). In Price v. Price, 243 Ga. 4 (252 SE2d 402) (1979),
after the decree of divorce was entered, the case was still pending and the
wife was allowed to amend
to assert a claim of resulting trust to real property. That decision is
equally applicable to a husband's right to amend.
Gorman v. Gorman, 236 S.E.2d 652, 239 Ga. 312 (1977)
"she be awarded such other and further relief as the court deems proper under the circumstances."
One commonly recognized maxim of equity states that equity seeks to do complete justice, and "having the parties before the court rightfully, it will proceed to give full relief to all parties in reference to the subject-matter of the suit." See Code Ann. § 37-105. Further, in equity, "a superior court shall have full power to mold its decree so as to meet the exigencies in each case." Code Ann. § 37-1203.
"Where
equity acquires jurisdiction for any purpose it will retain jurisdiction to
give full and complete relief, whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes
relating to the subject matter." Fuller v. Dillon, 220
Ga. 36 (1f) (136 SE2d 733) (1964); Code Ann. § 37-105. The court in making an
equitable division of the properties had the power to award the fee simple
interest to the wife and require
her to pay any outstanding indebtedness on the properties, including
taxes, insurance, and other fees and assessments.
REAVES v. REAVES, 259 S.E.2d 52, 244 Ga. 102 (1979)
For "such
other and further relief as to the Court seems fair and just."
it
was proper for the trial judge to divide the jointly held property as equity
demanded, and his order accomplishing this did
not amount to an award of alimony to the husband out of the wife's estate.
239Ga. at 314.
On November 21, 2018, a bond validation hearing regarding the Bonds was set for December 10, 2018.[14] On the morning of the hearing, four citizens of the City ("Intervenors"), who are the appellants in the present case, moved to intervene.[15] See OCGA § 36-82-77(a). At the same time, the Intervenors filed an answer
to the Development Authority's *546 petition for validation. The Intervenor's filing contained nine objections.
At the bond validation hearing, the Development Authority and the City presented their opening evidence, including the Bond documents described above and descriptions of the Bond mechanics. The Intervenors then testified to prove their residence within the City. At that time, the trial court expressed its intent to allow the Intervenors and the Developer, which had also filed a motion, to intervene. On the following day,
December 11, the trial court followed up its oral ruling by signing a written order allowing intervention of the
Intervenors.
On December 19, the bond validation hearing continued. The trial court received additional evidence that day regarding the proposed validation and the Intervenors' objections. Because of the voluminous nature of the filings and the evidence presented, the trial court continued the hearing one more time until December21. That day, all parties returned, and the trial court received even more evidence. Following this final day of the bond validation hearing, and after considering everything that had been timely presented up to that point, the trial court issued two written orders: one rejecting the Intervenors' objections on June 21, 2019, and one validating issuance of the Bonds on July 3, 2019. These two rulings form the crux of this appeal.
(b) Injunctive relief. As this Court has explained,
a citizen-taxpayer has standing in equity to restrain public officers from performing acts which the law does not authorize. However, absent expenditures of public revenue or performance of a duty owed to the public[,] a citizen-taxpayer has no standing in equity unless [he or] she has special damages not shared by the general public.
We also affirm the trial court's order rejecting Williams' request to conduct an in camera review of certain e-mails between various commissioners and the county attorney However, we further conclude that the trial court erred in considering the affidavits attached to the commissioners' answer to Williams' third amended complaint in reviewing the commissioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings, without properly converting the motion to one for summary judgment Therefore, we vacate that portion of the trial court's order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded.
The case Williams v. DeKalb County (Williams II) will be appealed to Georgia Supreme Court for the 2nd time.
Participation in an unlawfully closed meeting may be grounds for recall from office. See Steele v. Honea, 261 Ga. 644, 409 S.E.2d 652 (1991)
interpreting the Open Records Act and Open Meetings Act:
The History of the US Pledge
The Flag is a symbol of the Republic for which the Constitution Stands
(Use Your Rights or You Will Lose Them)
It is the collective and individual legal right of all citizens in the state of Georgia to expect that every article and provision of the Georgia Constitution is equally supported and protected for all its citizens by those who hold an office of trust and who take an oath. Any law that is inconsistent with the provisions should be declared void by the judiciary. It is the right of all citizens to hold their government accountable within the provisions of the Constitution through a petition, and the use of the courts.
Those who are elected and appointed to serve in the public interest shall support and protect the Constitution. It is the right of all citizens to expect equal protection under the law. All constitutional powers, authorities and individual rights should have the equal force of law to protect liberty, general welfare and ensure justice. Any violation of a constitutional provision is a violation of the fundamental principle of consent of the governed as ratified by the Georgia Constitution of 1983. All citizens should have the right to petition their government for redress of their grievance without any fear of intimidation, penalty, retribution or debt. The US Constitution protects its citizen’s rights to petition and redress their government and that no state should immune itself from the redress of its citizens and due process.
The government is not above the law and its powers are not without end, The government and its officials should be held accountable for their actions, and they should not be able to hide behind the claim of immunity for actions that are beyond their powers, authority and duties. - Ed Williams
History should not exclude the reality that others existed and their roles