State of Georgia v. O'NEAL, 273 SE 2d 631 - Ga: Court of Appeals 1980
Mobley v. Board of Commissioners, 311 SE 2d 178 - Ga: Supreme Court 1984
State of Ga. v. MacDougall, 229 SE 2d 667 - Ga: Court of Appeals 1976
MacDougall v. State of Georgia, 233 SE 2d 378 - Ga: Supreme Court 1977
Grogan v. City of Dawsonville, 823 SE 2d 763 - Ga: Supreme Court 2019
Palmer v. MITCHELL COUNTY FED &c., 377 SE 2d 4 - Ga: Court of Appeal
Aldrich v. City of Lumber City, 530 SE 2d 195 - Ga: Court of Appeals 1999
INJUNCTION AND EQUITY RELIEF O.C.G.A.
9-5-1 or O.C.G.A. 9-11-65
Sons of Confederate Veterans v. HENRY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Ga: Supreme Court 2022
This Court then routinely began applying Keen's rule to allow taxpayers to sue both cities and counties for alleged ultra vires actions, even without necessarily alleging an injury to the taxpayer, when it was clear that the ultra vires action would create an illegal debt, cause illegal expenses to be incurred, result in increased taxes, or misappropriate public funds. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lasseter, 114 Ga. 275, 281 (40 SE 287) (1901) ("Any taxpayers of the county had a right to apply to a court of equity to prevent the county commissioners from making contracts which they had no authority to make.");
Savage v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 671, 671-672 n.1 (251 SE2d 268) (1978) (concluding that the plaintiff, as a taxpayer of the City of Atlanta, had standing to seek injunction to prevent the City's commissioner of finance from paying out public funds under the authority of certain ordinances);
Clark v. Cline, 123 Ga. 856, 864 (51 SE 617) (1905) (taxpayers could sue to enjoin county from making illegal payments to city school system because taxpayer's contribution to public fund constituted a "pecuniary interest" that authorized him prevent "illegal diversion" of public funds); Fluker v. City of Union Point, 132 Ga. 568, 570 (64 SE 648) (1909) (noting well-established rule that "taxpayer may enjoin municipal corporations and their officers from making an unauthorized appropriation of the corporate funds or an illegal disposition of the corporate property"); Dancer v. Shingler, 147 Ga. 82, 84 (92 SE 935) (1917) (taxpayers can enjoin county board members from executing illegal contract that would expend money of taxpayers or incur indebtedness).
Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 272 (3) (b) (ii) (840 SE2d 423) (2020) (noting that, under Georgia law, the plaintiff's "status as a taxpayer generally affords him standing to seek to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of public funds" (emphasis added));
Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 43 (1) (70 SE2d 360) (1952) ("This court has many times held that citizens and taxpayers of both counties and municipalities have such interest as will authorize them to maintain actions to enjoin the unlawful disposition of public funds or property.").
Head, 215 Ga. at 265-266 (2) (taxpayers had standing to seek to enjoin State Revenue Commissioner from issuing liquor license to defendant);
See Keen v. City of Waycross, 101 Ga. 588, 592-594 (3) (29 SE 42) (1897); see also Koger v. Hunter, 102 Ga. 76, 79-80 (29 SE 141) (1897) (trial court erred in denying taxpayers' petition to enjoin county commissioners from misappropriating county funds).
There are several cases in which taxpayers have enjoined public officials related to illegal tax without a declaratory judgment, interlocutory injunction, individual injury, irreparable harm, or proven illegal expenditure of public funds, the likelihood of success,
RothschildII et al. v. Columbus Consolidated Government et al, 285 Ga. 477, 678 S.E.2d 76 (2009) (Citizen Standing)
Haugen V. Henry County et al., 277 Ga. 743 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004);
Flyman et al. v. Glynn County et al 276 Ga. 426 578 S.E.2d 124 (2003);
Johnstone et al. v. Thompson. 280 Ga. 611 631 S.E.2d 650 (2006);
Shadix et al. v. Carroll County et al. 239 Ga. App. 191 (1999);
Dickey et al. v. Storey et al. 423 S.E.2d 650 262 Ga. 452 (1992);
City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979);
Blackmon v. Golia, 202 SE 2d 186 (1973);
Martin v. Ellis, 249 SE 2d 23 - Ga: Supreme Court 1978.
Taxpayers had attacked statutes' constitutionality and sought injunctive relief without an individualized injury
City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979);
Martin v. Ellis, 249 SE 2d 23 - Ga: Supreme Court 1978.
Board of Commissioners v. Cooper, 264 S.E.2d 193, 245 Ga. 251 (1980)
Development Auth. of Cobb County v. State, 829 SE 2d 160 - Ga: Supreme Court 2019
Rich v. State of Ga., 227 SE 2d 761 - Ga: Supreme Court 1976
Henderson v. MARTA, 225 SE 2d 424 - Ga: Supreme Court 1976
Strickland v. Newton County, 258 SE 2d 132 - Ga: Supreme Court 1979
Camp v. Marta, 189 SE 2d 56 - Ga: Supreme Court 1972
Salem v. Tattnall County, 302 SE 2d 99 - Ga: Supreme Court 1983
Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 821 SE 2d 575 - Ga: Court of Appeals 2018
Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 859 SE 2d 33 - Ga: Supreme Court 2021
SHERRER
et al. v. HALE et al., 285 S.E.2d 714, 248 Ga. 793 (1982)
Dr. Sherrer also argues that because Mr. Hale has an
adequate remedy at law (money damages), injunctive (equitable) relief was not authorized. As
is often the case, in order to determine whether equitable relief is
authorized, we must first
ascertain what rights, if any, the plaintiff has which warrant protection.
Thus, we defer this question
until after consideration of the merits.
Dr. Sherrer argues
that the waiver provision is ineffective because the question of whether an
adequate remedy at law exists determines if the trial court has
equity jurisdiction and, under Code Ann. § 24-112, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the
trial court by agreement of the parties.
Although the
agreement of the parties is entitled to consideration, we agree that the parties cannot by waiver or consent
confer equity jurisdiction on a court where it is otherwise without
jurisdiction. E.g., Gray v. Gray, 229 Ga. 460, 461 (2) (192 SE2d
334) (1972); Sweatman v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 112 (97 SE2d 320)(1957); Code
Ann. § 24-112. We also agree
that equitable relief is improper if the complainant has a remedy at law which
is "adequate," i.e., "as *798 practical
and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the
remedy in equity." Middlebrooks v. Lonas, 246 Ga. 720, 721 (272
SE2d 687)(1980). See also Code Ann. § 37-120. However, in this case Mr. Hale is
without an adequate remedy at
law because he is currently being deprived of his investment and his elected
positions as director and secretary of a corporation in which he owns a
one-half interest. The
loss of these positions and their influence over the future direction of the
corporation in which he has an interest is not compensable in damages.
See Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204 (3) (116 SE 810) (1922).
EARLY v. EARLY, 252 S.E.2d 618, 243 Ga.
125 (1979)
"`Where equity acquires jurisdiction
for any purpose it will retain jurisdiction to give full and complete relief,
whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes relating to the subject matter.' Fuller v.
Dillon, 220 Ga. 36(lf) (136 SE2d 733)(1964); Code Ann. § 37-105." Gorman
v. Gorman, supra.
***LUTHER
et al. v. LUTHER, 289 Ga. App. 428, 657 S.E.2d 574 (2008)
Equity jurisdiction is established and allowed for the
protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar circumstances, the
operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from
anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done.[2]
Thus, "[e]quity will grant relief only
where there is no available adequate and complete remedy at law."[3] As otherwise
stated, "[e]quitable relief is improper if the complainant has a remedy at
law which is adequate, i.e., as practical and as efficient to the ends of
justice and its prompt administration as the remedy inequity."[4]
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
finding that it had equity jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief.
"Where equity acquires jurisdiction
for any purpose it will retain jurisdiction to give full and complete relief,
whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes relating to the subject
matter."[24]
STOKES
v. STOKES, 273 S.E.2d 169, 246 Ga. 765 (1980)
"such other and further relief as may
be equitable and just."
"such
other and further relief as the court deems meet and proper."
[This is just basically an open-ended statement indicating that the court has power to enterwhatever orders the court believes are necessary/appropriate under the circumstances. Usually this last sentence is a catch all phrase which asks the court for any additional relief or orders as they come up. It is boilerplate language that is in most complaints and summons. The phrase simply means the court is retaining jurisdiction and the ability to enter additionalorders should deem such are necessary and warranted.]
Regardless of the prayers of the
petition and answer as to "other and further relief," ... a "party may amend his
pleadings as a matter of course" (Code Ann. § 81A-115) to raise any claim,
not already adjudicated, as he or she has against the opposing party (Code Ann.
§ 81A-118). In Price v. Price, 243 Ga. 4 (252 SE2d 402) (1979),
after the decree of divorce was entered, the case was still pending and the
wife was allowed to amend
to assert a claim of resulting trust to real property. That decision is
equally applicable to a husband's right to amend.
Gorman v. Gorman, 236 S.E.2d 652, 239 Ga. 312
(1977)
"she be awarded such other and
further relief as the court deems proper under the circumstances."
One commonly
recognized maxim of equity states that equity seeks to do complete justice, and
"having the parties before the court rightfully, it will proceed to give
full relief to all parties in reference to the subject-matter of the
suit." See Code Ann. § 37-105. Further, in equity, "a superior court
shall have full power to mold its decree so as to meet the exigencies in each
case." Code Ann. § 37-1203.
"Where
equity acquires jurisdiction for any purpose it will retain jurisdiction to
give full and complete relief, whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes
relating to the subject matter." Fuller v. Dillon, 220
Ga. 36 (1f) (136 SE2d 733) (1964); Code Ann. § 37-105. The court in making an
equitable division of the properties had the power to award the fee simple
interest to the wife and require
her to pay any outstanding indebtedness on the properties, including
taxes, insurance, and other fees and assessments.
REAVES v. REAVES,
259 S.E.2d 52, 244 Ga. 102 (1979)
For "such
other and further relief as to the Court seems fair and just."
it
was proper for the trial judge to divide the jointly held property as equity
demanded, and his order accomplishing this did
not amount to an award of alimony to the husband out of the wife's estate.
239Ga. at 314.
